February 2026 - Helobubbas - mcs13.brattland.org

U.S. Gave Ukraine and Russia a June Deadline To Reach Agreement To End War
by mgbrattland＠gerlecreek.com 08 Feb '26

08 Feb '26

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/07/us_gave_ukraine_and_rus sia_a_june_deadline_to_reach_agreement_to_end_war_1163516.html

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DV Visit to Lincoln
by mgbrattland＠gerlecreek.com 07 Feb '26

07 Feb '26

https://x.com/MyLordBebo/status/2020219119593787662?s=20 CDR Mike Brattland, USN (Ret.) <mailto:mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> mgbrattland(a)gerlecreek.com <mailto:mgbrattland@brattland.org> mgbrattland(a)brattland.org Admin/Moderator SanDiegoCarGuys List & Calendar of Events <mailto:sandiegocarguys@brattland.org> sandiegocarguys(a)brattland.org 619 454-0496 '38 Willys 2 Dr Sedan Webmaster for <http://www.brattland.org/> www.brattland.org <http://www.overthehillgang.com/> www.overthehillgang.com <http://www.overdrivehotrodnews.com/> www.overdrivehotrodnews.com <http://www.gerlecreek.org/> www.gerlecreek.org <http://www.helobubbas.com/> www.helobubbas.com <http://www.prowlers.org/> www.prowlers.org <http://www.gerlecreek.com/> www.gerlecreek.com <http://www.ford6vcarburetion.com/> www.ford6vcarburetion.com <http://www.westcoastwillysclub.com/> www.westcoastwillysclub.com <http://www.nssha.org/> www.nssha.org <http://www.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> www.nhahistoricalsociety.org <https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/

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FW: Gaza isn’t Iraq
by mgbrattland＠gerlecreek.com 07 Feb '26

07 Feb '26

From: Andy Cain <andy.cain(a)comcast.net> Sent: Saturday, February 7, 2026 1:44 PM To: Mike Brattland <mgbrattland(a)gerlecreek.com> Subject: FW: Gaza isn’t Iraq Interesting perspective from a Brit whose been there, done that, and is a fellow with the Henry Jackson Society. https://henryjacksonsociety.org/staff/andrew-fox/ ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Andrew Fox from Fox On War <mrandrewfox(a)substack.com <mailto:mrandrewfox@substack.com> > Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2026 at 18:23 Subject: Gaza isn’t Iraq To: <https://eotrx.substackcdn.com/open?token=eyJtIjoiPDIwMjYwMjA2MTgyMzA4LjMuZW…> Why so much veteran analysis fails in Gaza ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ ͏ Forwarded this email? Subscribe here <https://substack.com/redirect/2/eyJlIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9tcmFuZHJld2ZveC5zdWJzdGF…> for more Members‑only analysis, shared publicly thanks to paid subscribers. Free subscriber? Upgrade to get every report like this, not just the unlocked ones. <https://substack.com/redirect/2/eyJlIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9tcmFuZHJld2ZveC5zdWJzdGF…> Subscribed _____ <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> Gaza isn’t Iraq Why so much veteran analysis fails in Gaza <https://substack.com/@mrandrewfox> Andrew Fox Feb 6 <https://substack.com/@mrandrewfox> <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> <https://open.substack.com/pub/mrandrewfox/p/gaza-isnt-iraq?utm_source=email…> READ IN APP It is tiresome and frustrating to see veterans of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan criticising Israel’s Gaza campaign through the lens of their own experiences in the Middle East, conducting counterinsurgency. Gaza was a very different kind of war. Understanding that difference and recognising the limits of one’s own experience are crucial to analysing the conflict clearly, which is why so many of these critics’ analyses fail. After decades in limited, expeditionary, nation-building conflicts, many veterans and serving soldiers have forgotten what high-intensity war looks like. They recognise it in Ukraine because it aligns with the Cold War hangover, Eastern European training scenarios that every NATO soldier pre-9/11 experienced, but I suggest that, because Gaza is in the Middle East, they see it solely through their own experiences there, unable to truly analyse what it actually is. Many American and British military veterans from the 2003–2020 period have examined Israel’s operations in Gaza and applied the counterinsurgency (COIN) framework they are well familiar with, condemning Israel against the metrics they themselves were judged on when deployed. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Western forces focused on “population-centric” strategies – securing and winning the support of the local population to isolate the insurgents. Classic COIN principles include relying on indigenous security forces, considering the support of the population as the centre of gravity, and exercising great restraint with firepower to avoid collateral damage that could alienate civilians. By clearing, holding, and building in liberated areas, the aim was to kill or capture insurgents in a way that would ultimately make civilians feel safer and more supportive of the host nation government. In <https://substack.com/redirect/812c8095-64d5-4db1-9517-5ad96521d9d6?j=eyJ1Ij…> General David Petraeus’s words, based on his experience leading the Iraq surge, “You can’t kill or capture your way out of an industrial strength insurgency” – you must also change conditions on the ground for the people. However, Hamas was not an insurgency; it was the government of Gaza. It is therefore unsurprising that when Petraeus and other veterans of the Global War on Terror examine the Gaza conflict, they instinctively reach for the COIN playbook. In Petraeus’s view, Hamas’s insurgent network could not be permanently eradicated by firepower alone – Israel would also need to “clear, hold and build” in Gaza’s neighbourhoods to prevent Hamas from re-emerging. <https://substack.com/redirect/8464c864-9069-44f6-b8c6-12bd62ecf955?j=eyJ1Ij…> He proposed measures typical of the Iraq handbook: establishing secure, gated communities and using biometrics to keep terrorists out, while providing basic services to win over locals. Petraeus acknowledged that Israel’s initial focus on destroying Hamas was necessary, but he argued that “military force alone won’t accomplish that goal” of long-term victory. In other words, after Hamas’s army was defeated, Israel should switch to a hearts-and-minds campaign, the kind of nation-building counterinsurgency that Western forces attempted (with mixed results) in the Middle East. Other veteran observers have echoed Petraeus’s doubts about Israel’s heavy kinetic approach. Col. (Ret.) Andy Milburn, a US Marine who commanded special operations in Iraq, wrote a detailed analysis in War on the Rocks questioning the scale of civilian harm in Gaza and suggesting Israel’s tactics were too permissive. Milburn noted that over 73,000 people were killed in the tiny Gaza battlespace (“over 71,000 Palestinians and nearly 2,000 Israelis”); an enormous toll in an area smaller than the city of Philadelphia. Roughly two-thirds of those killed were civilians, not combatants. Milburn argues this outcome was not inevitable simply because Gaza is dense and Hamas fights among civilians; in his view, it resulted from Israeli command decisions about how aggressively to use firepower under uncertainty. He observes that every modern army fighting in cities faces dilemmas about collateral damage, but “what distinguishes campaigns is… how commanders choose to respond… whose risk is prioritised, and what forms of harm are regarded as acceptable”. In Gaza, Milburn contends, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) consistently shifted risk away from its own troops onto civilians, defining “military targets” broadly and treating gaps in intelligence permissively, resulting in a tragic level of non-combatant deaths. His critique, like Petraeus’s, comes from a perspective honed in the counterinsurgency era: a belief that military operations must be constrained to protect the population, even if that means accepting more risk to one’s own forces. Gaza: a war, not an insurgency campaign The core issue is that the Gaza conflict was fundamentally not a counterinsurgency scenario, and Israeli leaders never viewed it that way. Unlike the US-led campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan, Israel’s fight in Gaza after Hamas’s 7 October massacre was a seven-front, hybrid state-on-state war of national survival, not a policing operation aimed at winning hearts and minds. Although Hamas is labelled a terrorist group, since the mid-2000s, it has also functioned as the de facto government of Gaza, controlling territory, running institutions, and maintaining a sizable armed force with both conventional and unconventional aspects. Gaza under Hamas’s rule became an Islamist mini-state on Israel’s border. When Hamas launched its surprise attack, Israel responded by declaring war and treating Hamas’s military wing as the army of an enemy state. Gaza was an all-out war against a hostile entity, with victory defined as eliminating the enemy’s military capability, not winning over its population. Context is everything. Israel found itself, in late 2023, in a multi-front war for national survival. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant <https://substack.com/redirect/5fb22b74-fa21-4813-91b6-67c31195d8bb?j=eyJ1Ij…> publicly stated, “We are being attacked from seven different arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.” In other words, the Hamas fight in Gaza was just one theatre of a wider conflict with Iran’s regional network of proxies. Israeli leaders feared that failure to crush Hamas would mean living under constant mortal threat. As Gallant told the Knesset, “Without meeting the goals of the war, people will not want to live [here]… It is a battle of national determination.” <https://substack.com/redirect/a4e6f6fa-c3bb-48eb-8d50-e55e8de32f3d?j=eyJ1Ij…> This framing of existential stakes led Israel to prioritise swift, decisive military action to neutralise Hamas, very much in line with its classic doctrine of seeking short, intense wars to quickly restore security. Petraeus himself noted that Israel’s strategic culture, unlike America’s in Iraq, is not about protracted nation-building; historically, Israeli reservists needed to “win and go back to the harvest,” favouring short, decisive campaigns over prolonged occupations. From the outset, Israel’s Gaza operation was designed as a combined-arms urban assault aimed at destroying Hamas’s military infrastructure, rather than as a patient counterinsurgency to win Gazan hearts and minds. The IDF lacked local indigenous forces to partner with; Gaza’s security forces were Hamas. Nor did Israel have any opportunity to persuade the Gazan population to support its campaign; most Gazans see Israel as an occupying power, considering their long history of conflict. The odds of winning their “hearts and minds” were always nil. As <https://substack.com/redirect/812c8095-64d5-4db1-9517-5ad96521d9d6?j=eyJ1Ij…> Jason Dempsey, a veteran of Afghan COIN efforts, observed, “It’s not an internal fight… These are two states that happen to be fighting”. In such circumstances, ‘population-centric’ methods were largely off the table. Any Israeli attempt to hold and rebuild Gaza amid war would have been perceived as an occupation, not liberation (and would have been globally condemned). Dempsey noted that “the narratives are so hardened… Israeli forces… will be seen as occupiers” by Gazans, regardless of their efforts to do good. Winning hearts and minds after generations of hostility would be much more challenging in Gaza than it ever was in Iraq’s Sunni provinces, and arguably impossible. Urban warfare Once the war began, the ferocity of combat in Gaza’s cities further highlighted how different this was from recent US-led counterinsurgencies. The IDF faced an enemy that had spent years transforming the urban landscape into a fortress. Hamas turned entire cities into a weapons system. They rigged buildings with booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), entrenched snipers and anti-tank teams in densely populated civilian areas, and built a complex network of tunnels beneath the streets for movement and shelter. Israeli troops often found that each apartment block had to be considered a hostile bunker. “You’ve got to clear every building, every floor, every room, every cellar, every tunnel,” Petraeus remarked about the challenge facing the IDF. There were 500 miles of fortified tunnels beneath Gaza – an underground “metro” that greatly exceeded what Israeli intelligence had expected. In Petraeus’s words, fighting Hamas in this environment was “more difficult and more challenging than anything that we [the United States] ever did” in Iraq or Afghanistan. This was full-scale urban warfare of a kind Western forces have rarely encountered in recent decades. <https://substack.com/redirect/3410f8d8-afbb-4636-ae0e-93e88b045598?j=eyJ1Ij…> A tunnel discovered by Israeli forces under a building in Gaza (February 2024). The Israeli campaign accordingly unleashed the full arsenal of combined arms in a concentrated area. Air force jets struck thousands of targets with precision-guided munitions. Heavy artillery battered militant strongpoints day and night. Armoured bulldozers and engineering units advanced to breach Hamas barricades and uncover tunnel shafts. Tank brigades and infantry battalions manoeuvred through city streets in tightly coordinated advances. This ‘enemy-centric’ approach aimed to maximise pressure on Hamas fighters at every turn, even if it risked massive destruction to the urban terrain. That is exactly what Israel did in Gaza: they fought a war, not a police action. Civilian casualties and the dilemma of restraint Certainly, the major tragedy (and controversy) of this method was the extent of civilian casualties in Gaza. Intense urban fighting against an enemy hidden among civilians is inevitably destructive. Over 71,000 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza conflict. Even if one accepts Israel’s claim that approximately 25,000 of the Palestinian dead were Hamas militants, that still leaves around 45,000+ Gazan civilians killed. This toll has drawn sharp criticism of Israel’s actions from many quarters, including veterans like Andy Milburn and Ryan Evans, who argue it could have been avoided with a more cautious strategy. To him and others, this indicates Israel’s rules of engagement were far too permissive, effectively treating large areas of the urban environment and its residents as legitimate targets under a broad interpretation of military necessity. From a COIN practitioner’s perspective, such an approach is not only morally troubling but also strategically counterproductive, because killing thousands of civilians almost guarantees resentment, insurgency, and future conflict. Israeli officials and supporters counter with a different narrative: Hamas is to blame for these deaths, because Hamas deliberately entrenched itself among civilians as <https://substack.com/redirect/fc0ae9ad-8368-412a-a7c0-919a53ab33e2?j=eyJ1Ij…> human shields and turned Gaza into a death trap. They (and I consider myself amongst them) argue that the IDF actually went to unprecedented lengths to spare civilian life, given the circumstances. For example, the IDF established dedicated humanitarian coordination centres and targeting review cells to vet strikes. They dropped millions of leaflets, sent text messages, and made phone calls urging residents to evacuate combat zones. The vast majority of munitions used were precision-guided, not dumb bombs, which theoretically allow for more careful targeting. Petraeus, no stranger to demanding restraint, acknowledged “the lengths that the IDF has gone to in order to try to get civilians out of the way” ahead of strikes, such as warnings and evacuation corridors. This was <https://substack.com/redirect/62595904-2a08-4a65-8e10-a5481d4de827?j=eyJ1Ij…> echoed by retired DSCACEUR, British General Sir John McColl. Petraeus called the IDF’s urban campaign in Gaza “fiendishly difficult” and noted that Hamas’s tactics (no uniforms, fighting from civilian buildings, holding hostages underground) greatly complicated efforts to avoid collateral damage. According to the IDF, its own forces paid a price for exercising some restraint. At least <https://substack.com/redirect/4521cf0c-d046-46e2-840d-e42a83b61172?j=eyJ1Ij…> 471 Israeli soldiers lost their lives fighting on the ground in Gaza, a toll many times higher (per capita) than what the US suffered in any single battle of the war on terror. Viewed in this light, it is almost a miracle that “only” 45-odd thousand civilians died, terrible as that number is. Given a battlefield packed with 2 million people, riddled with booby traps and tunnel ambushes, where every block could hide an IED or a Hamas squad, a completely unrestrained assault might have killed far more. For comparison, when Russia flattened Grozny in the 1990s or when the Allies firebombed cities in the Second World War, civilian deaths ran into the hundreds of thousands. By using precision weapons and issuing warnings, albeit imperfectly, Israel averted an even higher toll, its defenders claim. John Spencer has stated that “ <https://substack.com/redirect/8caf3430-dd3d-4fd5-b73b-41c481a758d8?j=eyJ1Ij…> the sole reason for civilian deaths in Gaza is Hamas” and that Israel’s unprecedented precautions effectively fulfilled its moral obligations in a hellish scenario. The truth is likely more nuanced: Israel did take significant steps to mitigate harm, yet also made conscious choices that accepted civilian deaths as collateral damage. What is clear is that Gaza faced a painful balance-of-risk dilemma with no simple solutions. Every extra restriction on firepower to protect civilians would have increased risks for Israeli soldiers and might have allowed some Hamas fighters to escape and cause more harm later. Every bold move to defend troops and achieve mission success meant the loss of innocent lives. Reasonable people can argue whether the IDF found a justified balance, but it is clear that Gaza’s war was fought under far more severe conditions than the counterinsurgencies where Western veterans gained experience. The perils of fighting the last war Why did so many seasoned soldiers and officers seem to misread the Gaza war at first principles? The answer lies in a common psychological pitfall: we all tend to interpret new problems through the lens of our own past experiences. Military professionals are no exception. In fact, they may be especially prone to this, given how strongly formative combat experiences shape their thinking. In my experience, armies do not encourage outside-the-box thinking. Historians have long noted that generals often fight the last war, projecting the lessons of their prior battles onto the next conflict, even when the situation is fundamentally different. A classic example: after observing early 20th-century wars, British officers “ <https://substack.com/redirect/54d86756-1561-4671-af90-c7a793b7b17c?j=eyJ1Ij…> tended to draw lessons which reinforced [their] own belief and the interests of [their] regiment or corps,” rather than genuinely embracing new realities. In other words, each expert saw what he expected to see. We see echoes of this in modern times. Veterans who served during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars internalised the importance of counterinsurgency doctrine: securing populations, winning hearts and minds, enforcing restrictive rules of engagement, and partnering with local allies. These were considered the keys to success in their formative conflicts (at least in theory). As a result, when they observe Gaza, their instinct is to criticise Israel for not doing these things: for lacking a competent local partner force, for not adequately protecting civilians, and for not having a detailed post-conflict reconstruction plan. Their analysis begins with what they know, as if every war were like Baghdad 2007 or Helmand 2010. It is a classic example of what psychologists call availability bias: a reliance on familiar frameworks even when they may not be appropriate. What is often overlooked in this approach is a proper understanding of Gaza’s unique context. A war studies academic or military historian, for example, might more readily compare it not to Iraq, but to other full-scale urban wars like the Battle of Grozny, Manila 1945, or even Berlin 1945. These conflicts imply very different expectations: extremely high civilian casualties, cities reduced to ruins, victory based on enemy combatants killed or captured rather than winning hearts and minds. Thorough research on Hamas’s strategy, the terrain, and the political stakes makes it clear that Gaza resembled a conventional interstate war (albeit with asymmetric elements) more than a counterinsurgency campaign. Military officers who rely solely on their operational experience, without carefully studying the new environment, risk misunderstanding such situations. We see this in their analysis time and again, Milburn being a perfect example. This is precisely why interdisciplinary war studies and military history are so crucial: they expand perspectives and help decision-makers avoid mirror-imaging every enemy as the last one they faced. In Petraeus’s case, to his credit, he did recognise many of these contextual differences. He called Hamas “the equivalent of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State” in terms of extremist irreconcilability, and acknowledged that “you have to… destroy them” through force. Yet Petraeus’s COIN mindset still led him to focus on what comes next: urging Israel’s war cabinet to transition to governance and rebuilding in Gaza to prevent Hamas 2.0. He was, in effect, superimposing the Iraq paradigm (where the surge was followed by the “Sunni Awakening” and rebuilding of local governance) onto a very different political reality in Gaza. This overlooked the fact that Israel, sitting in Gaza as an occupier and trying to build schools, would not be received the same way as US troops were by Iraqi tribes, either in Gaza or on the international stage (and the external political and activist pressure on Israel is not something this article has space to discuss, but it was another critical and differentiating factor between Gaza and other conflicts). Even in Iraq, acceptance was tenuous at best. Petraeus’s big ideas were not inherently wrong: a stable post-war Gaza is indeed a desirable goal, but the likelihood of achieving it through an Israeli-led COIN campaign is highly questionable, given the hardened attitudes and the significant manpower and time needed. Here, we see how even a brilliant general’s own experiences can lead to a kind of intellectual tunnel vision. He looks at Gaza and thinks, “Ah, this is how I’d do it, based on what worked for me,” without fully recognising how different the situation is. Andy Milburn’s critique similarly reflects the values of a professional deeply rooted in Western rules of engagement and post-Vietnam ethical standards. He is entirely correct that militaries should aim to reduce civilian casualties, but his view that the Gaza toll was excessive by definition arises from an implicit comparison to how US forces operated under wildly different conditions. In Baghdad or Kabul, if intelligence was uncertain about a target, US commanders generally held fire or used small munitions, accepting mission risks to err on the side of caution. Milburn expected the same or greater restraint from Israel. However, Israeli commanders in Gaza faced an enemy determined to exploit any restraint. Hamas routinely used human shields and launched attacks from protected sites specifically to discourage Israeli strikes. In such a scenario, excessive caution could lead to defeat or higher Israeli troop casualties. The harsh reality is that Western militaries in recent counterinsurgency campaigns have never had to engage in a full-scale battle of annihilation within a city where the enemy literally constructed the city into its defence system. The Gaza conflict was unique, and judging it by the standards of Iraq is a category error. Toward a better understanding of conflict Ultimately, the debate over Israel’s Gaza strategy highlights a broader lesson: each war must be understood on its own terms, not through a template of the previous conflict. Applying the counterinsurgency approach blindly to every conflict will lead to flawed analysis, just as blindly using a conventional war approach in the wrong situation would. Many veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan offered valuable insights during the public discussion, but their initial criticisms of the Gaza operation often failed basic principles because they relied on a COIN model that simply did not fit Gaza’s reality. To be clear, this does not imply that Israel’s approach was beyond criticism or that significant civilian casualties are somehow justified. It means that any critique must begin with an accurate understanding of the nature of the conflict. In Gaza, Israel was engaged in what it regarded as a high-intensity war for national survival, facing a heavily armed, fanatical opponent embedded within a cityscape more similar to Stalingrad or Mosul than to Baghdad’s counterinsurgency efforts. This context influenced Israeli decisions, for better or worse. Analysts who overlook it tend to propose solutions that seem sensible (e.g., “use less force,” “build trust with the locals”), but which the combatants themselves found unfeasible under the circumstances. The most insightful military analysis often emerges from combining practical experience with academic research. Learned war studies scholars and historically conscious officers can step outside their comfort zones and ask: what is the true nature of this war? What do the locals believe? What constraints do the troops face? These are the hard research yards: the careful study of context that avoids knee-jerk judgments. When we apply this to Gaza, we may still criticise Israel’s conduct (or, alternatively, defend many of its actions), but we do so based on solid ground, rather than rehashing outdated concepts on paper. The Gaza war was not Iraq redux. It was its own brutal saga, a blend of counterterrorism and conventional warfare with no exact precedent. Many veterans who served in the post-9/11 insurgencies did well to share their hard-won lessons, but they must be careful not to let familiar lessons become blind spots. Every war is a story unto itself. To learn for the future, we must analyse that story as it truly is, not as a mirror of our own past battles. [Footnote: there is a reason I do not use my retired rank of Major in any media or writing where I have the choice. I am primarily an academic conflict researcher; my military experience just adds knowledge and perspective when appropriate. I consider this to be the right way to do it.] Before you go… I am running a special offer in February. Upgrade to a paid subscription with 20% for the whole year. Upgrading also gives you access to the full archive and occasional subscriber-only pieces — the more detailed “so what?” posts that connect events across the Middle East and other conflicts. This weekend, I will be sending a post investigating Iranian subversion in Washington. It’s a shocking expose and you won’t want to miss it. If that sounds worthwhile, you can upgrade here: <https://substack.com/redirect/9c8b693e-17a5-45ba-a32a-718b4ab8a66c?j=eyJ1Ij…> 20% off in February special offer Either way, thank you for sticking with my work. Thanks for reading! This post is public so feel free to share it. <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> Share This post went to the whole list, but your subscription is the reason it exists. Paid readers cover the cost of travel, fieldwork and the hours of research it takes to turn that into something more useful than a hot take. Thank you. If you know one person who’d value this kind of reporting, feel free to forward it — you’re the reason this community grows. If you’d like to back this work for the long haul, you can switch to an annual plan in one click in your account settings. If there’s anything I can do to make this subscription more valuable to you, just let me know by reply. <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> Like <https://substack.com/app-link/post?publication_id=2661554&post_id=187113606…> Comment Restack © 2026 Andrew Fox 548 Market Street PMB 72296, San Francisco, CA 94104 Unsubscribe <https://substack.com/redirect/2/eyJlIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zdWJzdGFjay5jb20vc2lnbnV…> <https://eotrx.substackcdn.com/open?token=eyJtIjoiPDIwMjYwMjA2MTgyMzA4LjMuZW…> <https://email.mg1.substack.com/o/eJxEkEEO4yAMRU9TlpFxSEgWnCUyYDJoAlQE2ub2o7…>

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Russian General With Key Intelligence Role Is Shot in Moscow
by mgbrattland＠gerlecreek.com 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russian-general-with-key-intelligence-role- is-shot-in-moscow-574c8a14?st=cCPYQc <https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russian-general-with-key-intelligence-role -is-shot-in-moscow-574c8a14?st=cCPYQc&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink> &reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink CDR Mike Brattland, USN (Ret.) <mailto:mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> mgbrattland(a)gerlecreek.com <mailto:mgbrattland@brattland.org> mgbrattland(a)brattland.org Admin/Moderator SanDiegoCarGuys List & Calendar of Events <mailto:sandiegocarguys@brattland.org> sandiegocarguys(a)brattland.org 619 454-0496 '38 Willys 2 Dr Sedan Webmaster for <http://www.brattland.org/> www.brattland.org <http://www.overthehillgang.com/> www.overthehillgang.com <http://www.overdrivehotrodnews.com/> www.overdrivehotrodnews.com <http://www.gerlecreek.org/> www.gerlecreek.org <http://www.helobubbas.com/> www.helobubbas.com <http://www.prowlers.org/> www.prowlers.org <http://www.gerlecreek.com/> www.gerlecreek.com <http://www.ford6vcarburetion.com/> www.ford6vcarburetion.com <http://www.westcoastwillysclub.com/> www.westcoastwillysclub.com <http://www.nssha.org/> www.nssha.org <http://www.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> www.nhahistoricalsociety.org <https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/

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The folly of Negotiating with Iran
by Marc Liebman 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/fall-fall-is-better-than-jaw-jaw-the-folly-o… Marc Liebman https://www.marcliebman.com https://www.facebook.com/marcliebmanauthor/ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_sDoFQM5wupNaCeGIvKL1g Author of: Cherubs 2 Raider of the Scottish Coast Big Mother 40 Carronade Render Harmless Death of a Lady Forgotten Last Battles Inner Look For a Few Francs Moscow Airlift Predators The Simushir Island Incident Fight We Shall Flight of the Pawnee Failure to Fire Insidious Dragon The Red Star of Death Member of: The Author’s Guild Military Writers Society of America Association of Texas Authors North American Snowsport Journalists Association --

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Iran Probing
by mgbrattland＠gerlecreek.com 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2018858716498428323?s=20 CDR Mike Brattland, USN (Ret.) <mailto:mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> mgbrattland(a)gerlecreek.com <mailto:mgbrattland@brattland.org> mgbrattland(a)brattland.org Admin/Moderator SanDiegoCarGuys List & Calendar of Events <mailto:sandiegocarguys@brattland.org> sandiegocarguys(a)brattland.org 619 454-0496 '38 Willys 2 Dr Sedan Webmaster for <http://www.brattland.org/> www.brattland.org <http://www.overthehillgang.com/> www.overthehillgang.com <http://www.overdrivehotrodnews.com/> www.overdrivehotrodnews.com <http://www.gerlecreek.org/> www.gerlecreek.org <http://www.helobubbas.com/> www.helobubbas.com <http://www.prowlers.org/> www.prowlers.org <http://www.gerlecreek.com/> www.gerlecreek.com <http://www.ford6vcarburetion.com/> www.ford6vcarburetion.com <http://www.westcoastwillysclub.com/> www.westcoastwillysclub.com <http://www.nssha.org/> www.nssha.org <http://www.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> www.nhahistoricalsociety.org <https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/

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Another view on Iran
by Marc Liebman 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

For those of you who don’t know JINSA, suggest you look at their website – https://jinsa.org – and look at who they have as contributors. Some many of you may know. https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/JINSA-Iran-Summary-January-202… FYI, they, like ISW, have deep connections within the IDF and Israeli intelligence services and foreign policy decision makers. Marc Liebman https://www.marcliebman.com https://www.facebook.com/marcliebmanauthor/ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_sDoFQM5wupNaCeGIvKL1g Author of: Cherubs 2 Raider of the Scottish Coast Big Mother 40 Carronade Render Harmless Death of a Lady Forgotten Last Battles Inner Look For a Few Francs Moscow Airlift Predators The Simushir Island Incident Fight We Shall Flight of the Pawnee Failure to Fire Insidious Dragon The Red Star of Death Member of: The Author’s Guild Military Writers Society of America Association of Texas Authors North American Snowsport Journalists Association --

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ROK/DPRK and the PRC
by Marc Liebman 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

This is interesting…. https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-… If you have ever spent time on either the C7F or CNFK or CINCUNFORKOR, in the past, the war games and op planning often ignored the role of the PRC. Depending on the year, the Soviet/Russian role and support of the DPRK was always incorporated as was possible/probably commitment by the PLA. It changed from year to year, but the issue of a direct confrontation with the PRC was never in the cards in US/ROK planning. The direct confrontation with the PRC was always a “US issue.” Granted that no one in their right mind would believe the DPRK would invade the ROK without very strong commitments from the PRC and/or Russia, but politically, this was a non-starter within the ROK government. Keep in mind, their whole military establishment was based on staving off an invasion by the DPRK and holding on long enough for the U.S. to fully come to bear. Three things have happened. One, the ROK is so far ahead economically, it doesn’t want to risk a war in which the commercial engine that makes the ROK strong is destroyed. They are clearly in the deterrence mode and moving away from U.S. dependence on military equipment. Two, ROK leadership really doesn’t want to reunify. What it wants is a more normal, civilized relationship in which the borders is open to trade and people visiting families. Neither of these two are acceptable to Kim jung-Un and the Communist Party of North Korea. The longer they are split, the wider the economic divide becomes which makes the cost of re-building the DPRK greater. Plus, the pressure for re-uniting families dissipates as the generation split by the Korean War passes on. Three, ROK leadership sees itself as becoming a much stronger global economic power. It already a regional power and is tied with Australia in third behind the PRC and Japan in economic size. In A&D, they have built and are deploying a successor to the F-16, they have export orders for both commercial and navy ships, they’ve built a tank that is smaller and lighter than the M1 Abrams that has export customers. Granted, much of this is built using U.S. developed technology, but they have become serious players in the global A&D market. And, they are one of the world’s largest exporters of steel and electronic equipment. Samsung, LG, Hyundai, KAI are all world recognized brands. The Trump admin may be playing on this and encouraging the ROK to do more to become a regional military power, as is Japan. In any war over Taiwan, we need the ROK (and Japanese and Philippine) bases. Adding their military power to those of those other countries who might become involved presents a problem for the PRC. Marc Liebman https://www.marcliebman.com https://www.facebook.com/marcliebmanauthor/ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_sDoFQM5wupNaCeGIvKL1g Author of: Cherubs 2 Raider of the Scottish Coast Big Mother 40 Carronade Render Harmless Death of a Lady Forgotten Last Battles Inner Look For a Few Francs Moscow Airlift Predators The Simushir Island Incident Fight We Shall Flight of the Pawnee Failure to Fire Insidious Dragon The Red Star of Death Member of: The Author’s Guild Military Writers Society of America Association of Texas Authors North American Snowsport Journalists Association --

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Latest from ISW on Iran
by Marc Liebman 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-3-20… Unless the U.S. can get access to Saudi/Omani/UAE/Qatari/Bahrain bases for air strikes on Iran, this is going to be a Navy show with support from B1s and B2s. My gut says the IDF will play but to do it, the campaign planner in me says the Navy needs 3 carriers and that’s the problem…. Another problem is ordnance. I suspect we don’t have enough in theater and to get it there takes time. If I were the Strike Commander, right now, I’d want to know where both the IRGC’s Kilo subs are. If they are in the IO, then I’d want a fast attack in trail with a firing solution dialed in. Marc Liebman https://www.marcliebman.com https://www.facebook.com/marcliebmanauthor/ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_sDoFQM5wupNaCeGIvKL1g Author of: Cherubs 2 Raider of the Scottish Coast Big Mother 40 Carronade Render Harmless Death of a Lady Forgotten Last Battles Inner Look For a Few Francs Moscow Airlift Predators The Simushir Island Incident Fight We Shall Flight of the Pawnee Failure to Fire Insidious Dragon The Red Star of Death Member of: The Author’s Guild Military Writers Society of America Association of Texas Authors North American Snowsport Journalists Association --

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BG Teddy Roosevelt, JR. USA
by mgbrattland＠gerlecreek.com 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

https://x.com/Dr_TheHistories/status/2016474908403130429?s=20 CDR Mike Brattland, USN (Ret.) <mailto:mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> mgbrattland(a)gerlecreek.com <mailto:mgbrattland@brattland.org> mgbrattland(a)brattland.org Admin/Moderator SanDiegoCarGuys List & Calendar of Events <mailto:sandiegocarguys@brattland.org> sandiegocarguys(a)brattland.org 619 454-0496 '38 Willys 2 Dr Sedan Webmaster for <http://www.brattland.org/> www.brattland.org <http://www.overthehillgang.com/> www.overthehillgang.com <http://www.overdrivehotrodnews.com/> www.overdrivehotrodnews.com <http://www.gerlecreek.org/> www.gerlecreek.org <http://www.helobubbas.com/> www.helobubbas.com <http://www.prowlers.org/> www.prowlers.org <http://www.gerlecreek.com/> www.gerlecreek.com <http://www.ford6vcarburetion.com/> www.ford6vcarburetion.com <http://www.westcoastwillysclub.com/> www.westcoastwillysclub.com <http://www.nssha.org/> www.nssha.org <http://www.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> www.nhahistoricalsociety.org <https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/

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