Thanks, Jim The difference between the results of your tail rotor failure and the current one commented on a was a little luck.... your position relative to the surface...and a lot of pilot skill... which you have in abundance. Do you happen to know if anything was ever done to address the communication issues you experienced? Mike
On Oct 14, 2025 at 1:56 PM, Jim Sr Sturges <jwsturges@gmail.com> wrote:
Happened to me:
18 June 1971
In accordance with OPNAVINST 3750.6F
PART V: THE ACCIDENT
The crew of Troubleshooter 002—LT Sturges (HAC), LTJG H (Co-pilot), AW1 P (First Crewman), and AWAN S (Second Crewman)—briefed at 0830 for an AS mission.
The first hour and twenty minutes of the flight were normal in all respects. SN R. J. J was riding in the afterstation as a passenger.
At about 1145, AW1 P noted what he described as a thumping noise. After stabilizing in the last ditching area—a standard 40-foot ASW hover—Partin unstrapped and went aft to see if he could discover the source of the thump.
He described it as sounding as if a door were open and banging against the outside of the aircraft. AWAN S described it as sounding like someone stamping his foot on the floor of the aircraft.
The noise was not rhythmic, but random and seemingly non-directional. P removed his helmet and made an inspection of the afterstation. He stated that the volume of the noise did not seem to increase when he removed his helmet, and he could not locate its source. He did not check behind the thermal barrier in the pylon area.
The pilots were not aware of the noise, and the crewmen failed to report it to them.
Approximately five minutes later, as the Plane Commander ordered “UP” at the completion of the search, the aircraft started slowly turning to the right. At the same instant, P reported hearing a loud grinding noise which stopped after two or three seconds.
Application of left rudder had no effect, although the pilot reported feeling no unusual pressures or vibrations through the rudder pedals, which felt normal to him. The turn began to accelerate, but application of full left rudder failed to stop it.
After approximately 270° of turn, the pilot decided to land the aircraft on the water. He reported seeing both the Intermediate and Tail Chip Detected lights illuminated at this time.
In order to gain some control of the spin, he lowered collective slightly and made what he described as a sideward flare to the left, just prior to touchdown. The aircraft entered the water in a level attitude after approximately a turn and a half—540° of rotation.
After the aircraft settled into the water, the Aircraft Commander ordered his co-pilot to “cut the engines.”
Sea state was 5, with wave height about 8–10 feet. His decision was based upon the probability that the rotor tips might catch a wave top and complicate recovery. He was also concerned that if he released the full left rudder he was still holding, the aircraft might spin and tip over violently.
By this time the aircraft had turned further in the water and was sitting in a trough parallel to the swells. As the co-pilot shut down the engines, the pilot again looked at the caution panel and noted both INTMED and TAIL chip lights illuminated.
He then ordered the co-pilot to switch the UHF to the alternate antenna and transmitted on the ship’s CIC frequency:
“002 is in the water, three miles astern.”
This transmission was not received by CIC.
The rotor was allowed to coast to a stop, and the flotation bags were inflated by the co-pilot. However, it became apparent seconds after the rotors stopped that the aircraft could not remain upright for long in that sea state.
The Aircraft Commander ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Almost simultaneously, the aircraft rolled over to the left and immediately began flooding through the co-pilot’s window.
The pilot removed his emergency escape window frame and jettisoned it immediately upon water contact. The pilots and first crewman exited through the cockpit windows. The second crewman exited through one of the cabin windows, probably the one on the left side of the aircraft. The passenger exited through the cargo door escape hatch (see enclosure 11).
When all five personnel were on the surface, the Plane Commander tried—by shouting—to keep everyone close together, but was hampered by the high winds and sea state.
Each survivor was wearing flotation gear, all of which functioned satisfactorily. The Plane Commander carried a PRC-63 survival radio, which he used to transmit that his aircraft had ditched. This transmission occurred about 30 seconds after water entry.
It was received only by an F-4B (AA-112) overhead the ship. The F-4B relayed the message—
“002 is in the water, three miles astern”
— to the tower and provided an initial search vector of 200° relative, 2–3 miles.
The PRC-63 was allowed to transmit its beeper signal several minutes later. Both rescue helicopters reported hearing the beeper signal but neither was able to home in on it.
The Plane Commander and First Crewman began firing MK-79 pencil flares at this time. These were sighted by one of the rescue helicopters. All five survivors were picked up by two rescue helicopters and returned to FORRESTAL.”
Typos in original report
My thanks to CAPT (RET) Jim Ellington for hoisting me from the Med, and other HS-3 aircrews for rescuing the three other TRIDENT stalwarts, plus our well-entertained passenger. AW1 P did a good job of briefing him.
The only ding awarded by the accident board is that we failed to lower the gear, as recorded in the checklist. They further noted that it probably would not have made any difference in the outcome.
On Oct 14, 2025, at 10:51 AM, mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com wrote:
https://youtu.be/ChJEKMUEFYk?si=NA17CD4b8GBY82Mf
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