Not a lot of answers, but it looks like they tried to go around way too late. More or less a brand new Captain to the 767 and a low time FO. Not at all unusual, at least where I work. NTSB alluded to it at the end that there is at least chatter that 21 Air management might be a factor. A simple “no fault” go-around policy should have prevented this. 21 Air has an in house pilot union much like Southwest. I was never a big fan of unions, but they are effective at taking safety decisions away from the bean counters and placing them in the hands of the operators. I think we can all point a command in our military careers where raising safety issues wasn’t exactly career enhancing. Now imagine being potentially fired for following SOP at the expense of a bottom line. No evidence that is the case here, yet. It’s a small world and the streets appear to be talking, though. Clearly this was a case of horrible judgment, but I wonder if there were cultural reasons at the company that led to it. Occam’s razor remains sharp. Go-a rounds are rare, but they happen. My company is the butt of a lot of jokes (many deserved), but we are the industry leaders in stabilized approaches, for whatever that’s worth. I know a few people who got phone calls from the chief pilot for landing unstable approaches well inside whatever they pushed here. Those approaches landings were complete non-events outside of the FOQUA data. Conversely, I’ve had to do a couple go-arounds for various reasons, usually traffic related. Never heard a word about it. Clearly they got behind somehow and pushed ahead until it was too late. https://youtu.be/0kYavVsRkZY?is=oD2SD9CzRLhAg8IN
This article goes on and on, but the heart of it is in this paragraph: *A May 2023 FAA letter, which Walsh published, allowed 21 Air to substitute its own check airman for an FAA inspector on at least one takeoff-and-landing leg of initial or upgrade training. Honor system. The same federal instinct that let Boeing grade its own homework.* Amazon’s Cargo Contractor, 21 Air, Has Horrible Reputation Among Real American Pilots – Discern Report <https://discernreport.com/amazons-cargo-contractor-21-air-has-horrible-reputation-among-real-american-pilots/> It gave me a flashback to my days in industry. ISO 2001 certification was handled by a company that AMAT paid. Wink, wink, nod, nod. On 9/9/2026 8:06 AM, Brian Miller wrote:
Not a lot of answers, but it looks like they tried to go around way too late. More or less a brand new Captain to the 767 and a low time FO. Not at all unusual, at least where I work. NTSB alluded to it at the end that there is at least chatter that 21 Air management might be a factor. A simple “no fault” go-around policy should have prevented this.
21 Air has an in house pilot union much like Southwest. I was never a big fan of unions, but they are effective at taking safety decisions away from the bean counters and placing them in the hands of the operators. I think we can all point a command in our military careers where raising safety issues wasn’t exactly career enhancing. Now imagine being potentially fired for following SOP at the expense of a bottom line. No evidence that is the case here, yet. It’s a small world and the streets appear to be talking, though. Clearly this was a case of horrible judgment, but I wonder if there were cultural reasons at the company that led to it. Occam’s razor remains sharp.
Go-a rounds are rare, but they happen. My company is the butt of a lot of jokes (many deserved), but we are the industry leaders in stabilized approaches, for whatever that’s worth. I know a few people who got phone calls from the chief pilot for landing unstable approaches well inside whatever they pushed here. Those approaches landings were complete non-events outside of the FOQUA data. Conversely, I’ve had to do a couple go-arounds for various reasons, usually traffic related. Never heard a word about it. Clearly they got behind somehow and pushed ahead until it was too late.
https://youtu.be/0kYavVsRkZY?is=oD2SD9CzRLhAg8IN
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I watched part of the NTSB interview. Late bad decisions. I had to go around once in Denver led down the primrose path by a Captain who thought he was giving good guidance until ATC turned me short of about 4 fixes I need to get down and slow down in a A321CEO. I was full a people and heavy on gas. 14000lbs of gas and about 225 people going into Denver in late spring or early summer so the DA was also a factor. No trick to get the aircraft slowed down enough to get flaps out worked.. gear early, all the speed brakes it would give and Fifi wasn't going to be slow and stable enough to land and I made my own decision to go around. I had about maybe 400 hours in model at that point or less. I had started to slow down when I thought it was a good idea but the Captain told me it was too soon.. until it wasn't. He was a good dude and actually said I was actually right to try and slow down when I did and he was wrong to have me wait. No muss no fuss. Now the word on the street from a fellow Bubba and retired Frontier Captain is the 767 captain in question only got his type rating in May of this year. Not even 4 months experience and they threw him in the left seat. Former Army Blackhawk pilot so someone who didn't fly airplanes until probably fairly recently. I am about 2 classes at the airline behind Brian and probably fairly close on hours within a couple hundred maybe. I am 1700 and change in model now. Both Brian and I are in the zone to upgrade to Captain should a opening occur. We meet all the requirements and I would hazard both of us are better qualified than that crew was flying a wide body. One thing to note is how the cargo all shifted significantly in the mishap and blocked the cockpit door which makes me wonder if they didn't have shortcuts on cargo securement too. The FAA and NTSB may well shut that place down. On 9/9/2026 7:06 AM, Brian Miller wrote:
Not a lot of answers, but it looks like they tried to go around way too late. More or less a brand new Captain to the 767 and a low time FO. Not at all unusual, at least where I work. NTSB alluded to it at the end that there is at least chatter that 21 Air management might be a factor. A simple “no fault” go-around policy should have prevented this.
21 Air has an in house pilot union much like Southwest. I was never a big fan of unions, but they are effective at taking safety decisions away from the bean counters and placing them in the hands of the operators. I think we can all point a command in our military careers where raising safety issues wasn’t exactly career enhancing. Now imagine being potentially fired for following SOP at the expense of a bottom line. No evidence that is the case here, yet. It’s a small world and the streets appear to be talking, though. Clearly this was a case of horrible judgment, but I wonder if there were cultural reasons at the company that led to it. Occam’s razor remains sharp.
Go-a rounds are rare, but they happen. My company is the butt of a lot of jokes (many deserved), but we are the industry leaders in stabilized approaches, for whatever that’s worth. I know a few people who got phone calls from the chief pilot for landing unstable approaches well inside whatever they pushed here. Those approaches landings were complete non-events outside of the FOQUA data. Conversely, I’ve had to do a couple go-arounds for various reasons, usually traffic related. Never heard a word about it. Clearly they got behind somehow and pushed ahead until it was too late.
https://youtu.be/0kYavVsRkZY?is=oD2SD9CzRLhAg8IN
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participants (3)
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Brian Miller -
Dan -
Kevin Black