FYI&SA From the perspective of a British Para (SF).  -------- Original message --------From: Albie Fox ---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Andrew Fox from Fox On War <mrandrewfox@substack.com>Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2025 at 11:30Subject: Gaza ceasefire declaredTo:A tenuous peace͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­͏     ­Forwarded this email? Subscribe here for moreGaza ceasefire declaredA tenuous peaceAndrew FoxOct 10 READ IN APP Greetings, all. We are just days from the possible return of the Israeli hostages—jubilation. I have made this a free, long article looking at all aspects of the proposed ceasefire deal. All I asked is that you share it.Fox On War is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.SubscribedA deal was inevitableAs of this morning, the ceasefire is in effect—for now. After two years of relentless conflict in Gaza, the war between Israel and Hamas has ended not with a decisive victory, but with an inevitable negotiated settlement that might still fall apart. From the start, it was clear that no matter how fierce Israel’s campaign against Hamas was, it would ultimately lead to some form of agreement with the very group it sought to eliminate. This reality is uncomfortable for Israel: any deal with Hamas demands painful concessions. Nonetheless, the White House ultimately prevailed over all other interests. The only good thing to come out of the UN during the last two years is that Trump seized the opportunity at the General Assembly to bribe, threaten, and cajole leaders across the Middle East to pressure Hamas into reasonable negotiations, then put Bibi in a headlock until he accepted the deal on the table.Kudos to Trump. It would have saved a lot of suffering if only a world leader had had the spine to do this two years ago.Phase OneThe first phase of the Gaza peace plan focuses on a hostage-prisoner exchange, a swap that Israel’s government has agreed to despite its bitterness. Under the deal, Hamas and other Gaza militant factions will release the dozens of hostages they have held since the 7 October attacks, including all remaining Israelis (around 20 believed alive) and even the bodies of those killed in captivity. In return, Israel will release a large number of Palestinian prisoners from its jails, reportedly over a thousand inmates. This list allegedly includes some 250 individuals serving life sentences (many convicted of deadly attacks) plus roughly 1,700 Gazans who were detained in the sweeps following the 2023 Hamas onslaught. For Israeli society, watching convicted terrorists walk free is a bitter pill to swallow, but one worth the cost. Many of those being freed were involved in brutal crimes; their jubilant homecomings will be extremely hard for victims’ families and the broader Israeli public to stomach. Yet these difficult concessions were the price to pay to secure the release of Israelis who had been held hostage for so long.For Hamas, entering into this deal demands its own difficult compromises as Trump’s machinations leave them isolated from the allies who have kept them in the fight for two years, notably Qatar and Turkey. On one side, Hamas’s leaders have assured the mediators that they will follow the ceasefire terms, release all hostages held, and accept certain restrictions on their military actions. On the other side, Hamas must demonstrate strength to its supporters and allies, maintaining the domestic image that it is still a viable operator in Gaza. Striking a balance between these two demands will be challenging and could influence how lasting the truce ultimately proves to be.Hamas has already sown doubt. Officials from the group have claimed that they do not know the whereabouts of every hostage. They maintain that other armed factions in Gaza might be holding some captives or have been lost amidst the chaos of war. This could be partly true: smaller militant groups like Islamic Jihad initially took some hostages and may not fully abide by Hamas’s ceasefire. It could even be a cynical tactic by Hamas to buy time and prolong Israeli anxiety, keeping the pain of uncertainty alive. In any case, by suggesting it cannot locate all captives, Hamas sets the stage either to justify incomplete compliance or to gradually delay hostage releases, gaining maximum leverage and publicity with each batch. However, the deal, as reported, contains clauses to bypass these delays. We will see what prevails. Gili Cohen has the scoop on the ceasefire implementation text:Hamas’s leadership also faces internal and external pressure over how this deal influences perceptions of victory or defeat. Publicly, they are already promoting the prisoner release component as a triumph – evidence that armed resistance forced Israel to concede. Indeed, seeing hundreds of Palestinians freed is a major propaganda victory for Hamas, which can claim it achieved through resistance what negotiation alone never could.At the same time, Hamas must be careful not to seem as if it has sold out or surrendered. Some members of its base will scrutinise any sign of Hamas disarming or relinquishing control of Gaza. The group’s political wing will likely emphasise that it agreed only to a temporary ceasefire and humanitarian measures, not to its own dissolution. Hamas’s leaders will walk a fine line: fulfilling any promises made to President Trump’s envoys enough to keep the agreement alive, while also using defiant rhetoric to reassure Palestinians that Hamas remains strong and unbroken. We can expect Hamas-controlled media and mosques in Gaza to portray the ceasefire as a tactical pause, possibly even a strategic victory, rather than a capitulation. How convincingly Hamas manages this balance will influence whether hardline factions split off or whether the ceasefire holds without major breaches.One immediate test of Hamas’s post-war strength will be how it manages the fractious internal landscape in Gaza, where power dynamics have shifted during the conflict. Over the past year, Israel quietly encouraged and armed local Palestinian clan-based militias to rise up as an alternative to Hamas’s rule. This was a deliberate part of Israel’s strategy once its forces invaded parts of the Strip. By exploiting old resentments and promising weapons or autonomy, Israel succeeded in activating certain powerful families and tribal clans in Gaza to assert themselves.Key figures emerged during the chaos, operating with Israeli acquiescence. For example, Yaser Abu Shabab, a young Gazan tribesman, who, with dozens of armed relatives, took charge of key aid distribution routes. These militias branded themselves as local “Popular Forces” maintaining order in areas Israel had cleared of Hamas. In reality, they often behaved like warlords: looting aid convoys, settling scores, and worsening the humanitarian crisis, all under the watch of Israeli forces. Nevertheless, Israel’s government, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, openly admitted supporting these clans as a counterbalance to Hamas. “What’s bad about it?” Netanyahu remarked in one briefing, essentially arguing that empowering Hamas’s local enemies saved Israeli soldiers’ lives on the battlefield.Now, with a ceasefire coming into effect and Israeli troops withdrawing to agreed lines, the future of these clan militias is uncertain. Hamas certainly has not forgotten who collaborated against it. As Hamas cadres and police re-emerge in Gaza’s streets under the ceasefire’s cover, they will seek to reassert control over neighbourhoods and border zones that fell under clan influence.We could witness a low-level civil war simmering in parts of Gaza: Hamas security forces versus the Israel-aligned militias. Threats have been made in some southern areas as Hamas moves back in and armed clans refuse to relinquish their newfound fiefdoms. How this unfolds will be a telling indicator of Hamas’s residual strength. On Thursday (9th October), a significant battle was reported at Gaza City port between Hamas and the Abu Warda family, with dozens of civilians caught in the crossfire. If Hamas can swiftly and quietly disarm these militias and co-opt or neutralise their leaders, it will show that the group still holds the core power in Gaza despite two years of pummelling.However, if fighting intensifies between rival Palestinian groups or if some clans openly defy Hamas’s authority, it could indicate a breakdown of governance in Gaza. Such fragmentation might even benefit Israel by keeping Hamas occupied internally. Ironically, Hamas may find itself relying on the proposed International Security Force peacekeepers or observers (if those materialise as part of the deal, and which reportedly includes 200 American troops) to help mediate these internal disputes. The very presence of these alternative power centres in Gaza is a new outcome of the war, and managing them will challenge Hamas’s claim to be the sole “resistance” authority.While leaders negotiate deals and militants contend for power, the popular mood on Gaza’s streets reveals a sobering truth: the people are far from reconciliation. The war may be ending, but hearts and minds remain inflamed by hatred. On the night the ceasefire was announced, thousands of Palestinians in Gaza poured into the ruined streets to celebrate what they perceived as Hamas’s victory and the end of their nightmare. Amid the jubilation, there were also deeply disturbing scenes that highlight just how wide the gap is between ordinary Gazans and any notion of coexistence with Israel. In some crowds, celebrants erupted into a notorious chant: “Khaybar, Khaybar ya Yahud, jaish Muhammad sa-ya’ud!” Translation: “Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews, Muhammad’s army will return.”) This slogan harks back to a 7th-century battle in which Muslim armies defeated a Jewish community at Khaybar, and its modern usage is a direct threat of violence against Jews.Videos of men, women, and children in Gaza chanting this in unison spread across social media. To Israelis and Jewish people worldwide, hearing “Khaybar, Yahud” is chilling. It signals that many Gazans are not celebrating peace at all, but rather what they perceive as an impending triumph over Israel. Such scenes reveal the depth of enmity that years of blockade, conflict, and propaganda have sown. Reconciliation, even basic mutual acceptance, feels heartbreakingly distant when crowds exult in a slogan that effectively calls for another massacre of Jews. These same crowds are the ones who, in time, will form the electorate and societal foundation of any future Palestinian polity in Gaza (or even in a unified Palestinian state, should one ever emerge). If and when Palestinians get to elect new leaders, the prevailing public sentiment will heavily influence who rises to power. Right now, that sentiment in Gaza is full of anger, trauma, and a desire for vindication, not compromise. This does not suggest a likely moderate voting intention.This reality check is essential. It shows that although a deal has been signed and a pause has been implemented for now, the fundamental conflict between the peoples remains unresolved. Genuine healing or peace requires a shift in mindset that currently seems distant. International optimists talk about “reconstruction and reconciliation” in Gaza, but images of celebratory hate chants suggest that rebuilding homes will be easier than rebuilding trust. For Israel, this is a warning sign: any solution that leaves Gaza’s population resentful (and Hamas narrating the war as a victory) could be just a pause before the next round of conflict, perhaps years later, when memories of suffering fade and arsenals are rebuilt.While all eyes are on Gaza, another ticking time bomb remains unaddressed: the West Bank. The war and subsequent deal have done nothing to resolve the broader Palestinian question, particularly the status of the West Bank and its leadership. In fact, the outcome in Gaza has somewhat sidelined the West Bank issue for now, but it cannot be ignored for long. The Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, is internationally recognised as the representative of the Palestinians, yet it has been largely absent in the Gaza war endgame. Years of corruption, mismanagement, and authoritarian rule have left the PA widely discredited among Palestinians. Many in the West Bank (and certainly in Gaza) view the PA as venal, ineffective, and hopelessly out of touch. This war only amplified that sentiment: while Gaza bled and fought, Abbas’s administration in Ramallah issued press statements and continued its usual security coordination with Israel. The PA appeared impotent, and its claims to someday govern Gaza again ring hollow.Nonetheless, any long-term framework for peace or stability would presumably involve some role for the PA or a revamped Palestinian governance structure. Trump’s ceasefire plan even hints at a “temporary technocratic Palestinian committee” to run Gaza during reconstruction, but whether that leads to the PA resuming control, new elections, or some joint arrangement, the fact remains that Palestinian politics are deeply fractured. Hamas may have survived the war battered but popular among its base; the PA remains intact in the West Bank but lacks legitimacy. Who will actually represent the Palestinian people in the next stage of diplomacy? That is unresolved, and it complicates any Phase Two political process.From Israel’s perspective, the West Bank presents a different kind of challenge. Gaza, despite its ferocity, is geographically isolated. The West Bank, on the other hand, sits right on the doorstep of Israel’s heartland and would form the core of any future Palestinian state. Israeli hawks argue that relinquishing military control of the West Bank (as was done in Gaza in 2005) would be suicidal. They point to Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and imagine rockets from the West Bank next, threatening Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport. Indeed, during the Gaza war, there were numerous attacks in the West Bank and an increase in violence there, although Hamas does not control that territory (where polling remains high: were there an election tomorrow, Hamas would win a landslide). For Israel, the idea of strategic depth remains essential: maintaining a security grip on the West Bank hills and the Jordan Valley is considered vital to prevent the West Bank from becoming another launchpad for terror. This is a central issue that the current Gaza ceasefire deal does not address at all.Going forward, any broader peace agreement will require answering very difficult questions: what happens to the Israeli control and settlement of the West Bank? Can the PA be reformed or replaced to govern Gaza and the West Bank effectively? Will Israel ever permit a fully sovereign Palestinian state next door, or will it insist on a continuous security presence with all the hatred and resentment that engenders? The current version of the end of the Gaza war has answered none of these questions.In fact, Israel’s far-right ministers have expanded settlement building and crackdowns in the West Bank over the past two years, doubling down on a vision of permanent Israeli control. The Gaza deal may have paused one conflict, but it has arguably made the future of the West Bank even more uncertain. International mediators will eventually have to face this, because a Gaza-only peace arrangement is incomplete and probably unsustainable if the West Bank remains unstable. For now, though, the focus is on stabilising Gaza. The West Bank remains an unresolved dilemma, lurking in the background of the new status quo.Phase TwoThe ceasefire currently in implementation is considered Phase One of a broader plan for Gaza. Officially, Phase Two aims to address the more ambitious issues: disarming Hamas (or, more likely, integrating its fighters into some security framework), establishing new governance in Gaza, and initiating extensive reconstruction with international funding. However, there is significant uncertainty about whether Phase Two will ever come to fruition as planned.A similar pattern occurred before: during the war, pauses in fighting for limited hostage exchanges were intended to lead to wider negotiations, but these collapsed as trust eroded and fighting resumed each time. Earlier this year, mediators attempted and failed to secure a lasting truce; the war continued for many more brutal months. That memory remains vivid now. Is this time different? There is some hope, considering the comprehensive scope of Trump’s 20-point peace blueprint and the support of regional powers. Yet, scepticism persists about whether Hamas, Israel, and other stakeholders will follow through beyond the immediate exchanges and pauses.One major reason why Phase Two is so challenging is that it requires much tougher concessions and guarantees than the initial ceasefire. For Hamas, freeing hostages is one thing; however, it is much more difficult for Hamas to relinquish its weapons or control of Gaza, even temporarily. Nonetheless, Trump’s plan calls for exactly that: Hamas would eventually need to disarm or at least cease to exist as an armed force, with Gaza’s governance handed over to a neutral Palestinian administration under international supervision.So far, Hamas has agreed in principle to some parts of this vision, but it has deliberately resisted endorsing the full initiative, particularly the sections on disarmament and transferring power. Statements from Hamas officials have been cautious – even yesterday, it was reported they rejected the Tony Blair-led transitional authority scheme.On the Israeli side, there are also significant doubts. Even moderates within Israel wonder if they can ever truly secure Gaza without an IDF presence, regardless of what guarantees are written on paper. Therefore, Phase Two involves a leap of faith that neither side is naturally inclined to take.However, there is a new complication now that was absent in previous failed truces: the involvement of multiple regional heavyweights as guarantors. Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey have all risked their credibility in supporting this deal. As part of the agreement, these countries (along with the United States) are effectively co-signing the ceasefire and endorsing its enforcement. This means that if Israel were to decide next month to strike Gaza again, it would be breaking its word to Doha, Cairo, and Ankara, who have invested diplomatic capital in this peace. That significantly raises the stakes and makes it much harder for Israel to resume hostilities, bringing with it a threat of regional escalation. We can already see the effect: Israel’s security cabinet was reportedly uneasy about tying its hands, but the need to satisfy the mediators’ conditions left it little choice. Likewise, Hamas knows that any major breach on its part would anger the very patrons (Qatar and Turkey) that provide it with funding, shelter for its exiled leaders, and international legitimacy.The Gaza ceasefire has strong guarantors and external support. This could help it endure, but it also means any failure of the deal risks wider regional consequences, something all sides will now try to avoid. Still, whether Phase Two ever occurs depends on building trust, which is currently difficult. It may need small steps: for example, gradual weapons handovers supervised by Turkey or Egypt, or a slow deployment of a multinational force in Gaza to reassure Israel. At present, it remains uncertain if that stage will be reached, not to mention the many opportunities for Hamas to use reconstruction to stay in power behind the scenes.There is cautious optimism in Washington and Doha that this time will be different, that the pain and exhaustion of two years of war have sufficiently changed everyone’s calculations. However, if there is anything the last few decades of the conflict have taught us, it is to be prepared for setbacks. Phase Two is written on paper; it remains to be seen whether it will be realised in reality.Diplomacy over forceThroughout the Gaza conflict, Israeli officials repeatedly asserted that military force was the only language Hamas understood. You can see Yoav Gallant’s take on this in the latest edition of my podcast with Jake Wallis Simons, The Brink. Israel’s declared aim was to dismantle Hamas through overwhelming force, eliminate its leaders, and ensure it could never threaten Israeli citizens again. For a long time, force indeed was the primary tool. The IDF bombarded Gaza month after month, and Hamas continued firing rockets and launching guerrilla attacks on IDF troops, who sustained over 3,000 casualties and 600+ killed in action.In the end, however, this conflict has once again shown with stark clarity that there are limits to what force can accomplish. As I have written many times before, military power alone, without a political strategy, eventually reaches a limit. To truly resolve a prolonged conflict like this, diplomacy and economics, the other tools of statecraft, must be utilised. In this final agreement, it was the skilful (albeit far too long-delayed) combination of all three tools that ultimately secured success.Let us break down those levers:Military pressure. First and foremost, Israel’s military campaign, although it did not eradicate Hamas, significantly weakened the group on the ground. After two years, Hamas’s infrastructure in Gaza lies in ruins: its tunnels have collapsed, many commanders have been killed, and weapons stockpiles have been depleted. Gaza’s population was beleaguered and desperate. This pressure was a necessary backdrop; Hamas might not have considered a deal had it not been under severe military strain. However, force alone clearly could not free the hostages or ensure a future without Hamas resurgence. It set the stage but could not deliver the final act.Diplomatic negotiation. The United States assumed a leading role in brokering talks, dragging Netanyahu to the table and giving him clear orders; but, as importantly, regional mediators such as Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey were persuaded to facilitate a conclusive ultimatum to Hamas. Quiet shuttle diplomacy over several months gradually outlined the contours of an agreement. Security guarantees to Qatar were a crucial part of this diplomatic effort. Qatar was persuaded by a security pact with Washington and an apology from Netanyahu over last month’s attempted strikes against Hamas leadership in Doha. As an aside, the failure of this strike to kill their intended targets was fortunate, in hindsight: had it succeeded, there would have been few Hamas representatives left to negotiate with. Its failure inadvertently gave Washington the excuse to put pressure on Qatar to do what it should have been compelled to do two years ago: force Hamas to the negotiating table on Washington’s terms.Meanwhile, Turkey’s involvement was secured through high-level diplomacy, with the US and others dangling incentives like advanced weapons deals and restored partnerships. President Erdoğan had positioned himself as a champion of the Palestinian cause; engaging him and offering American military aid helped bring Turkey firmly behind the ceasefire plan.Egypt, for its part, was persuaded by a mixture of pressure and promises: as Gaza’s neighbour, Egypt was terrified that the chaos of the war might spill over. Along with continued aid incentives, the US and Israel made clear that if fighting continued, the humanitarian collapse could force mass Palestinian displacement into Sinai, a nightmare scenario for Cairo. This implicit threat of a refugee exodus encouraged Egypt to intensify mediation efforts, utilising its intelligence channels with Hamas to push for an agreement. Essentially, diplomats aligned the interests of all key players to cease the war, employing carrots and sticks tailored to each audience.Economic leverage and aid. The promise of substantial economic aid and reconstruction funds for Gaza also facilitated the deal. All sides acknowledged that Gaza’s humanitarian situation was dire. Trump’s plan includes an ambitious economic reconstruction programme (with input from international experts and Gulf states) to rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure and housing. This is a significant incentive for Hamas. If they comply, they stand to see Gaza’s people receive billions in aid, which could increase Hamas’s popularity (even if others manage the funds). Conversely, the withholding of economic lifelines served as a punitive measure: Israel and the US had already strangled what remained of Gaza’s economy during the war. Only through peace could Gaza reopen for trade and access to fuel, electricity, and supplies on a large scale.For regional actors, too, economics played a significant role. Gulf Arab nations signalled their willingness to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction and in the West Bank’s economy if a credible peace process was in place. For Turkey, beyond arms deals, the prospect of contracts for rebuilding Gaza’s infrastructure is appealing. For Egypt, ending the war would mean normalising trade and movement at its Rafah border, possibly supported by international funding to help develop the impoverished Sinai region. Economic incentives and relief were key components that convinced the parties that a deal would be fruitful, whereas continued war only led to ruin.In the end, it required a mixture of military stalemate, intensive diplomacy, and strategic incentives to break through to peace. No single method would have been enough. The Gaza war highlighted that while brute force can create the conditions (by weakening an adversary), it cannot alone unravel the political complexities of a conflict, especially one involving hostages and civilians. Diplomacy laid out the roadmap and framework for concessions, while economic bargaining provided incentives and face-saving measures to make those concessions acceptable. This multi-layered approach is what finally led Hamas to accept terms and Israel to agree to compromises Bibi would not have considered a year earlier (to the world’s shame: pressure on Qatar, particularly, should have come much sooner).RamificationsThe immediate outcome of the war’s end is a relief for millions. No more Israeli protests, hostages are coming home, and civilians in Gaza are seeing their first real respite in two years. Yet the broader ramifications of this deal will reverberate in the region’s politics for a long time, presenting a mix of hope and trouble.For Israel, the war leaves behind a diplomatically isolated nation in perhaps its weakest international position in decades. Over the course of the Gaza campaign, global public opinion, even among Israel’s traditional allies, swung sharply against the Israeli government’s conduct. Graphic scenes of destruction in Gaza, civilian casualties, and an intractable humanitarian crisis eroded the sympathy Israel had garnered after the October 2023 Hamas massacres. Once the world’s media get into Gaza, this condemnation will intensify when the devastation is broadcast globally. Many countries in the Global South (and their publics) now openly view Israel as a pariah state; in Europe and the USA, too, there were mass protests and political calls to sanction Israel.While the United States under Trump remains a staunch backer (in spite of Israel’s plummeting support in polls to existential threat levels, especially among Democrat voters), even Washington’s tolerance had limits, as evidenced by Trump’s eagerness to broker a ceasefire rather than see Israel press on indefinitely. Israel comes out of this war more isolated on the world stage than ever. This isolation will act as a handbrake on Israel’s freedom of action going forward. If, say, in a few months, hardliners in Jerusalem argue for a quick military strike in Gaza or elsewhere, they will face a wary international community that is far less inclined to give Israel the benefit of the doubt. Israel will need to rebuild trust and show it is committed to a political solution if it wants to avoid total pariah status.Politically within Israel, the fallout of the war has also been significant. Netanyahu’s government is hanging on by a thread; the public is furious at the failures that led to the 2023 surprise attack and the gruelling war that followed. The unity government formed during the war is fraying, and early elections are likely on the horizon once the dust settles. Israel’s society is deeply scarred both by Hamas’s initial atrocities and by the loss of life (especially soldiers) in Gaza. There is a sense of exhaustion and disillusionment. The “mighty Israel” that many Israelis believed in has been rattled to the core, realising that military supremacy did not deliver a clear victory. Israel’s leadership will have to navigate a period of strategic vulnerability without the usual blanket of international support it once enjoyed. That said, following victory after victory in the Seven Front War, Israel is militarily in its strongest position in decades. However, remember that international relations have other levers, and diplomatically and economically Israel will face significant challenges in the coming months and years. The intifada is globalised and international support for the Palestinian cause is at an all-time high.What about Hamas? In a paradoxical way, Hamas remains standing in Gaza, but in a fundamentally altered state. On paper, the deal likely means Hamas relinquishes day-to-day governance of Gaza (at least for now) to the technocratic committee. Its fighters are supposed to disarm or, at a minimum, refrain from any military activity. The organisation has suffered enormous losses: an estimated half or more of its fighting force has been killed or wounded; it no longer exclusively controls the borders or airwaves; many of its tunnels and command centres are gone; and its Turkish and Qatari international backers are subdued. For the foreseeable future, Hamas is neutered as a military threat to Israel.The ceasefire’s terms and the international monitoring will ensure that if Hamas even begins to rearm or dig new tunnels, it would risk immediate repercussions. In short, Hamas faces significant limitations that will hinder its ability to launch attacks on Israel in the near future, which is exactly what Israeli strategists wanted.However, it is equally true that Hamas has not been eliminated. Far from it. Its leadership (mostly safely abroad in Doha and Istanbul) is intact, and even within Gaza, the organisation will seek to retain influence behind the scenes. We should not be naïve: Hamas will quietly work to infiltrate the new governance structures, keep its loyal civil servants in place, and possibly hide arms for the future. For now, though, Hamas’s calculus is to survive and declare victory. They will point to the release of Palestinian prisoners as a huge achievement and the survival of their regime as proof that Israel’s offensive failed. Indeed, in the eyes of many in the Arab and Muslim world, Hamas weathered the onslaught and is still standing when many thought it would be toppled. This narrative, however distasteful to the West, means Hamas’s brand of “resistance” might remain influential.Looking at Gaza’s immediate future: the enclave will begin the arduous task of reconstruction under international supervision. This may take decades. If Hamas plays its cards smartly, it will let the technocrats rebuild homes and hospitals (taking credit whenever convenient) while it regroups politically. The hope among deal-brokers is that over time, Gazans might come to favour a more peaceful course if they see improvements in living conditions and if some form of normalcy returns. There is at least a chance that a new generation of leadership can take root in Gaza during this transition, marginalising Hamas’s rule. Yet, given the public mood described earlier, one cannot be overly optimistic. It will require years of stability and opportunity to even begin to dilute the hostility that war has cemented and the plan has significant flaws.The ramifications of this war’s end are complex. Israel, though militarily strong, exits the war diplomatically weaker and internally divided. It got its hostages back and achieved a quieter border for now, but at great cost to its global reputation.Hamas emerges militarily crippled but politically alive, likely still the power behind the curtain in Gaza, though constrained from acting out violently. It avoided total annihilation and can spin aspects of the deal as victories.The Palestinian people of Gaza get a desperately needed respite and a chance (however slim) at a better life through reconstruction. But they also remain under the shadow of a leadership struggle (Hamas vs others) and carry forward a legacy of hate and trauma from the war.Key regional players like Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey have enhanced their diplomatic stature by brokering peace, but they now also share responsibility for enforcing it. The US has reasserted its influence by orchestrating the deal, yet its guarantee of Israel’s security will be tested in new ways if Israel feels restrained.Finally, we should acknowledge a bittersweet truth. Given the horrendous alternatives, this messy deal is likely the best possible outcome at this point. As I wrote in the Tablet all the way back in March 2024,If you look at what is possible, what the best version of “success” looks like… the version of Hamas that Gazans will get is one heavily degraded militarily, and, most importantly, with vast swaths of their tunnels and civilian-embedded infrastructure destroyed.No one is cheering that Hamas is still around or that killers are going free, but the alternative was an open-ended war with endless bloodshed and no clear victor. Now, at least, hostages are coming home to their families, the violence and suffering of war have ended for now, and Gaza’s long-suffering civilians can begin to breathe again. That is no small thing.If the ending of the Gaza War opens a door, even a crack, toward a different future, then some good can still come from the pain. It will take wise leadership and sustained international engagement to widen that door. The world will be watching anxiously to see if this ceasefire truly marks a turning point, or just a pause before the next storm. For now, at least, there is a glimmer of hope that the guns can remain silent and the hard work of healing can begin.Thanks for reading Fox On War! This post is public so feel free to share it.ShareInvite your friends and earn rewardsIf you enjoy Fox On War, share it with your friends and earn rewards when they subscribe.Invite Friends LikeCommentRestack © 2025 Andrew Fox548 Market Street PMB 72296, San Francisco, CA 94104 Unsubscribe