Yup. This doesn’t have all the lessons learned and I was stunned to read that the AF admitted why V-22 wasn’t used – piss poor hover performance at 7,000 or any altitude much above sea level, reliability (they’re more dangerous to the crews than the enemy. Sorry, I couldn’t resist) and they couldn’t carry the OH-6s. They left one out which is that it has a radar signature of the side of a large steel building. The article also downplays the value of SERE training, knowledge of self-aid, physical fitness, mental toughness which kept Dude 44B going to say nothing of the constant God’s eye picture the two Reaper’s provided. The piece also doesn’t mention that the new survival radios are harder to detect than the older beacons which makes it harder for the bad guys to find the survivor. And, that it enables the survivor to communicate with a medical team that can help with dealing with medical issues. Info from the Reapers could have been fed to Dude 44B which may have been used to help avoid contact with Iranian search teams as well as call in close air support. Marc Liebman https://www.marcliebman.com https://www.facebook.com/marcliebmanauthor/ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_sDoFQM5wupNaCeGIvKL1g From: Mike Brattland <mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> Date: Friday, April 10, 2026 at 4:07 PM To: HeloBubbas <helobubbas@helobubbas.com> Subject: [Helobubbas] FW: Aviation Week :: Downed F‑15 Crew’s Rescue in Iran Yields Lessons On Contested Recon CDR Mike Brattland, USN (Ret.) mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com<mailto:mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> mgbrattland@brattland.org<mailto:mgbrattland@brattland.org> Admin/Moderator SanDiegoCarGuys List & Calendar of Events sandiegocarguys@brattland.org<mailto:sandiegocarguys@brattland.org> 619 454-0496 ’38 Willys 2 Dr Sedan Webmaster for www.brattland.org<http://www.brattland.org/> www.overthehillgang.com<http://www.overthehillgang.com/> www.overdrivehotrodnews.com<http://www.overdrivehotrodnews.com/> www.gerlecreek.org<http://www.gerlecreek.org/> www.helobubbas.com<http://www.helobubbas.com/> www.prowlers.org<http://www.prowlers.org/> www.gerlecreek.com<http://www.gerlecreek.com/> www.ford6vcarburetion.com<http://www.ford6vcarburetion.com/> www.westcoastwillysclub.com<http://www.westcoastwillysclub.com/> www.nssha.org<http://www.nssha.org/> www.nhahistoricalsociety.org<http://www.nhahistoricalsociety.org/> https://sh60fhoas.nhahistoricalsociety.org/ From: Harold Brattland <habrattland@arvig.net> Sent: Friday, April 10, 2026 1:50 PM To: Brattland, Mike * <mgbrattland@gerlecreek.com> Subject: Aviation Week :: Downed F‑15 Crew’s Rescue in Iran Yields Lessons On Contested Recon Check out this site https://aviationweek.com/defense/budget-policy-operations/downed-f-15-crews-... -- Downed F‑15 Crew’s Rescue in Iran Yields Lessons On Contested Recon Share Brian Everstine<https://aviationweek.com/author/brian-everstine> April 10, 2026 [fighter in flight] The downing of the F-15E in Iran sparked the largest rescue operation in recent memory. Credit: U.S. Air Force The failed Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 mission to rescue hostages inside Iran served as a major turning point for U.S. special operations forces, with the loss of personnel, Lockheed Martin C-130s and helicopters spurring massive changes in training and joint operations. It also specifically led to the requirements for the Bell Boeing<https://aviationweek.com/term/boeing> V-22 Osprey tiltrotor, developed to avoid having to create a dangerous forward operating base in hostile territory. Forty-six years later, U.S. forces again penetrated Iran on April 3—reportedly 240 mi. away from the original Desert One landing site—and again used C-130s and helicopters for the massive, daring rescue of an F-15E weapons system officer known as Dude 44 Bravo. Commanders higher up the chain opted to not use the V-22 seemingly developed for this exact scenario. Experts who spoke to Aviation Week point to specific characteristics of the rescue and operational limitations to the Osprey. This time, the rescue was successful and all crew members survived, though Lockheed Martin C-130s and helicopters were again destroyed on Iranian soil. * Altitude issues may have informed aircraft selection * Special operations ‘ideally suited’ for recovery “No lives were lost. We succeeded because the joint force is always at the ready,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine said in an April 8 Defense Department briefing. “They trust each other, they trust their leaders, and they trust their training. And they remember, first and foremost . . . that we do these things so that others may live and we will never leave anyone behind.” The rescue of the F-15E pilot, Dude 44 Alpha, came first in a daring daylight rescue that went as by the book as possible for U.S. Air Force Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) crews. Shortly after the Strike Eagle was down, pararescue crews on a Lockheed Martin HC-130J Combat King II and two Sikorsky HH-60W Jolly Green II helicopters flew into Iran and recovered the pilot. The helicopters received damage from enemy fire, though they were able to reach friendly airspace. Later over the weekend, the Central Intelligence Agency located the F-15E weapon systems officer, sparking a massive personnel recovery mission that featured 155 aircraft and hundreds of personnel, including U.S. special operations forces on the MC-130s. The tally included four bombers, 64 fighter jets, 48 refueling tankers, 13 rescue aircraft and more, President Donald Trump said in an April 6 briefing. Ravi Chaudhary, who last served as an assistant secretary of the Air Force and was also personnel recovery director for U.S. forces in Iraq, says force packages vary on a number of factors, based on an immediate response need or deliberate recovery approach. For immediate combat search and rescue, there is a “beautiful orchestra” of different capabilities ready to spring into action—intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; strike aircraft; airspace; and control, Chaudhary says. This is immediate—“you don’t have to wait for an order; it just happens,” he says. Over time, there is a transition toward a deliberate personnel recovery mission. Air tasking orders and components in all domains shift to create an operational picture focused on recovering the individual, which a commander then creates a force package around. In this case, the mission was what military doctrine calls a Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR), with special operations forces used to recover isolated personnel, he says. While Eagle Claw and this rescue appear similar, they are doctrinally different. The former was a hostage rescue with very detailed planning and preparation, while Dude 44 was a quickly coordinated NRA. In this case, commanders focused on issues such as terrain, distance and geography to create a force package for the mission, Chaudhary says. The V-22 excels at going faster and farther than typical helicopters and operating without a landing strip. However, the design of the aircraft—particularly its rotor diameter and high amount of downwash—leads to poor performance at high atitude. At higher altitudes, the Osprey’s capability to carry useful loads at long range and get out again can be somewhat limited, U.S. Air Force Gen. (ret.) Jim Slife says. Slife, who left the service in 2025 as vice chief of staff, also served as commander of Air Force Special Operations Command and vice commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and commanded at several other levels, including leading the 1st Special Operations Wing and the Joint Special Operations Aviation Detachment in Afghanistan. Mountainous terrain can be the Osprey’s Achilles heel because design compromises limit its high-altitude hover performance. That issue arose in carrying quick-reaction forces in Afghanistan. V-22s have experience rescuing F-15E crews, however. In March 2011, two MV-22s from the USS Kearsarge, along with other aircraft, conducted the tactical recovery of a pilot downed in Libya as part of Operation Odyssey Dawn. Slife, who has been out of service and not read into the current operations, says from his now-outside perspective, the choice to use MC-130s was likely “more a pragmatic risk decision than anything else.” Other considerations could include the V-22’s lack of guns and ongoing reliability concerns with the fleet. The daytime rescue of the pilot was a courageous example of Air Force CSAR operating in a high-risk scenario to retrieve the pilot. Slife noted that special operations forces were well suited to handling the later rescue of the backseater. “SOF was ideally suited for the deliberate personnel recovery mission of the WSO, following the in-extremis recovery of the pilot by Air Force CSAR forces,” Slife says. “All in all, it was a superb display of joint operations.” One issue to follow will be how the forces quickly evaluated the remote runway for incoming aircraft. Specifically of interest will be how the crews were able to measure the California Bearing Ratio—a test to evaluate the strength of a road, in this case to support multiple C-130s. Typically, forces would arrive before the aircraft to evaluate the surface, and in this case, it may have been misjudged—leading them to destroy aircraft that got stuck in the sandy surface. [https://aviationweek.com/sites/default/files/styles/author_thumbnail/public/...] Brian Everstine<https://aviationweek.com/author/brian-everstine> Email: brian.everstine@aviationweek.com<mailto:brian.everstine@aviationweek.com> Brian Everstine is the Pentagon Editor for Aviation Week, based in Washington, D.C.